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If the representation of the (L 1 1)th stimulus is a repetition of
a representation already in consciousness, there is no reason
(apart from temporal context) why the representation of the rep-
etition should not overwrite the representation already in con-
sciousness. It was noted above that, before the (L 1 1)th stimulus
is added to a list of L stimuli differing in content, the total num-
ber of representations in consciousness that differ in content ap-
proximates L. After the addition of an (L 1 1)th stimulus that is
not a repetition of a list stimulus’ content, the total number of rep-
resentations differing in content will be increased to (L 1 1). But
if the (L 1 1)th stimulus does repeat a content, and then the rep-
resentation of that (L 1 1)th stimulus overwrites the representa-
tion whose content it repeats, the total number of representations
differing in content will remain at L.
Now, a participant would be helped to detect the fact that the
(L 1 1)th stimulus repeats a content if he or she notices that the
addition of the (L 1 1)th stimulus causes no observable change in
the total number of differing contents represented in conscious-
ness. Let P&V’s effortlessness be denoted by E. We hypothesize
that E varies directly with the contrast between a change and no
change in that number. So E will be defined, relative to L, as:
E 5 [(L 1 1)/L] 2 [(L 1 0)/L] 5 (1/L) (3)
Let D denote the time required to detect that the (L 1 1)th stim-
ulus is a repetition, and let D vary inversely with E. The greater
the effortlessness, the shorter the detection time. Then:
D 5 (a/E) 5 [a/(1/L)] 5 La (4)
The reason the constant of proportionality in Equation 4 is as-
sumed to equal a is that Equations 4 and 2 are thereby consistent
because, when L 5 1, D 5 a in both equations. Furthermore,
when L . 1, Equation 4 specifies that D 5 (La). The term (La) is
conventionally called the “decision latency” component of the
Sternberg function and is contrasted with a “residual latency” de-
termined by routine response processes.
Next, we turn to the memory span task. Following the presen-
tation of L differing list stimuli, the participant must recall all L
stimuli in correct serial order. In a Sternberg task using digit-triple
material, the probability that a representation of a particular list
stimulus would still be in consciousness after the presentation of
the final list stimulus, but prior to the onset of the (L 1 1)th stim-
ulus, was specified by Murray et al. (1998, p. 1199) to be (1 2 m)i.
Here, i is the number of list stimuli intervening between that list
stimulus and the end of the list; usually i 5 (L 2 1). In a memory
span task, the equivalent would be the number of stimuli (includ-
ing both list stimuli and the recalls of those list stimuli) interven-
ing between the presentation of a particular list stimulus and the
recall of that stimulus. Here too, this number equals (L 2 1).
The probability, P, that all of the L list stimuli will be correctly
recalled in order, is:
P 5 (1 2 m)L(L21) (5)
Cavanagh (1972, p. 527) defined the memory span, S, as being that
L value associated with a probability of 0.5 of being correctly re-
called in order. Dividing both sides of Equation 5 by 2P, and sub-
stituting S for L in Equation 5, yields:
0.5 5 [(1 2 m)S(S21)]/(2P) (6)
Taking natural logarithms and rearranging terms of Equation 6
gives:
2ln(1 2 m) 5 {2ln[0.5(2P)]/(S 2 1)}(1/S) (7)
From Equation 2, the left side of Equation 7 equals (a 2 u), so
Equation 7 becomes:
a 2 [(2lnP)/(S 2 1)](1/S) 1 u (8)
Equation 8 is Cavanagh’s function expressing a (the slope of the
Sternberg function) as a linear function of (1/S) (the reciprocal of
the memory span). Its intercept is u and its slope is [(2lnP)/(S 2
1)]. Cavanagh’s estimated value of the intercept was 0.0028s, and
his estimated value of the slope was 0.2432s.
Cavanagh also reported the obtained values of a and of S asso-
ciated with each of seven materials. The estimated values of m for
the seven materials ranged from 0.0301 (for single digits) to
0.0678 (for nonsense syllables). The mean value of the seven esti-
mates of the slope of the Cavanagh function, derived by calculat-
ing [(2lnP)/(S 2 1)] for each material, was 0.2431s.
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Abstract: We are sympathetic with the broad aims of Perruchet & Vin-
ter’s “mentalistic” framework. But it is implausible to claim, as they do, that
human cognition can be understood without recourse to unconsciously
represented information. In our view, this strategy forsakes the only avail-
able mechanistic understanding of intelligent behaviour. Our purpose
here is to plot a course midway between the classical unconscious and Per-
ruchet &Vinter’s own noncomputational associationism.
We are sympathetic with the general thrust of Perruchet & Vin-
ter’s (P&V’s) “mentalistic” framework. In particular, we endorse
their attempt to establish a principled connection between men-
tal representation and conscious experience (see, e.g., O’Brien &
Opie 1999a). And, like them, we are suspicious of orthodox, intel-
lectualist approaches to the cognitive unconscious. Nonetheless,
in developing the notion of a “self-organizing consciousness,” P&V
go too far when they contend that unconsciously represented in-
formation plays no role in human cognition. As we explain shortly,
this thesis throws out the computational baby with the classical
bathwater, and thereby forsakes the only available mechanistic un-
derstanding of intelligent behaviour. Our purpose in this com-
mentary is to plot a course midway between the classical uncon-
scious and P&V’s own noncomputational associationism.
At the heart of P&V’s project is the claim that (unconscious,
noncomputational) associative processes of learning and memory
are sufficient to generate conscious mental representations whose
contents are isomorphic with the world. This is a very bold claim.
It flies in the face of the classical computational program in cog-
nitive science, which assumes that conscious representations are
the product of a vast amount of unconscious symbol manipulation
governed by unconscious rules. It is therefore incumbent on P&V
to provide a detailed account of the kinds of associative processes
they have in mind.
Yet, as far as we can determine, P&V directly address the na-
ture of mental association in just three relatively short passages of
the target article. First, they briefly discuss how associative learn-
ing can explain classical conditioning (sect.1.3.3). Second, in re-
sponse to the apparent inability of associative processes to account
for the full complexity of human cognition and conscious mental
life, they suggest that such processes are not limited to acting on
elementary stimuli but can be extended to complex representa-
tions (sect. 2.2.2). And third, they claim that primitive represen-
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tations that are repeatedly linked in attention “tend to pool to-
gether and form a new primitive,” which is then available as a uni-
tary representation in subsequent processing (sect. 3.2). All of the
ensuing discussion presupposes that mental association has been
adequately explained, and P&V concentrate on showing how the
complex conscious representations it produces can account for
human behaviour in various domains.
What we are suggesting is that P&V’s discussion of mental as-
sociation is insufficiently developed to bear the burden of their
principal thesis. This becomes especially apparent in section 6.4,
where P&V help themselves to representations with increasingly
abstract contents. These, they explain, can be formed by iteration
of the same basic associative processes already described. Yet, be-
cause they have said so little about these processes, it is difficult
for the reader to assess the plausibility of this claim.
It is not surprising that P&V fail to specify associative processes
adequate to the complexities of human cognition. Associationism,
in various guises, has been around for a long time, and its short-
comings are well known. Two of these deserve mention here.
The first concerns the raw materials on which associative
processes putatively operate, specifically, conscious representa-
tions. Whatever the status of the claim that the conscious states
produced in the course of processing linguistic input are the re-
sult of associative processes,1 the same cannot be said of other per-
ceptual modalities, especially vision. This is because visual expe-
rience is radically underdetermined by the data available in the
proximal stimulus (the dynamic array of light falling on the reti-
nae). The conclusion most theorists find inescapable is that visual
perception is an inferential, rather than associative, process – one
that constructs visual representations by combining stimulus data
with internally represented assumptions about the structure of the
environment. Because we are not aware of this process, visual in-
ference, and the representations it implicates, must be uncon-
scious (see Fodor & Pylyshyn 1981; and for a more recent state-
ment, Palmer 1999, pp. 55–59).
The second problem runs even deeper and concerns the phys-
ical implementation of cognitive processes. What is required to ex-
plain cognition is a physical mechanism that can account for the
parallelism between the content of mental representations and
their causal relations (see, e.g., Fodor 1987, Ch.1). This challenge
stumped proponents of associationism in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, who only permitted contiguity and co-occur-
rence of ideas as ultimate explanatory principles. Behaviourism,
essentially a nonmentalistic version of associationism, was likewise
explanatorily impoverished. It was only the emergence of the clas-
sical computational theory of mind, inspired by the power of dig-
ital computers, that saw the first serious contender for a mecha-
nistic account of cognition. Classicism offers a story as to how the
causal interactions between mental representations (in the form
of symbol structures) preserve their semantic relations. But this
story is distinctly nonassociationist, given that it depends on the
operation of unconscious, structure-sensitive rules. Because these
rules, and much of the information they implicate, are not con-
sciously available, classicism delivers the sophisticated cognitive
unconscious P&V are at pains to avoid.
In short, as things currently stand, the only idea we have of how
cognitive processes might be physically implemented in the brain
assumes that these processes are computational in form. To aban-
don computationalism in favour of a mentalistic form of associa-
tionism, as P&V exhort, is thus to embrace mystery.
But P&V need not despair. There is a path that runs midway be-
tween classical computationalism and mentalistic associationism;
a path that avoids the classical unconscious without abandoning
computationalism. We finish by plotting this middle way.
The middle way is to reject classicism, with its commitment to
a symbol crunching unconscious, in favour of the connectionist
computational theory of mind. As we have explained at length in
this journal (O’Brien & Opie 1999a), connectionism permits a dis-
tinction between explicit (activation pattern) representation and
inexplicit (connection weight) representation that is perfectly
crafted for P&V’s mentalistic framework. Instead of claiming that
unconscious information plays no role whatever in human cogni-
tion, they should restrict this claim to unconscious, explicitly rep-
resented information. Even if all explicitly represented informa-
tion is conscious, inexplicit representation is still free to carry the
burden of the cognitive unconscious. In this story, the links be-
tween conscious representations are computational, rather than
merely associative, because they are mediated by connection
weight representations. Such representations embody, for exam-
ple, unconscious assumptions about the visual world, but in non-
symbolic form. Thus, the unconscious one ends up with is very dif-
ferent from its classical counterpart. Moreover, the conscious
(explicit) and unconscious (inexplicit) are intrinsically and deeply
connected, because activation pattern representations are shaped
by inter-unit connections. To use P&V’s own metaphor (sect. 1.3.1),
they are like the two sides of a coin, inseparable, yet distinct.
NOTE
1. P&V’s work on this topic is, we think, highly significant, and does
much to undermine traditional models of word segmentation, grammar
learning, and so on, which help themselves to an implausibly rich cogni-
tive unconscious.
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Abstract: The SOC framework does not take into account the fact that the
oral modality consists of purely transient data, which is not the case for the
other modalities. This, however, has important consequences on the na-
ture of oral and written language, on language consciousness, on child lan-
guage development, and on the history of linguistics.
In section 2.1, Perruchet & Vinter (P&V) posit the existence of an
isomorphism between “the actual and the represented world,” and
explain that “complex representations account for seemingly rule-
governed behavior.” This is made possible by the existence of the
self-organizing consciousness (SOC), the principles of which are
exemplified in PARSER. The power of PARSER was put to the
test on a computer by replicating a learning situation tested with
infants and adults by Saffran and collaborators (Saffran et al.
1996a; 1997). The situation corresponds to the extraction of words
from raw phonetic input.
The performance of PARSER is very impressive – as is that of
infants and adults – but maybe not so much so when one consid-
ers the characteristics of the input signal. All syllables in the input
are of the same duration, the same height, share the same struc-
ture, and are repeated more than a thousand times in the same sit-
uation. In such contexts, primitives such as syllable segmentation
and syllable identification work so well that the problem to be
solved becomes too simple and does not adequately represent real
life situations. Of course, there is a lot of information other than
word regularities that helps children get the job done in real life
situations (see target article, sect. 4.1; Johnson & Jusczyk 2001;
Perruchet & Vinter 1998b). Nonetheless, this affects the working
context of PARSER and undermines the demonstration of P&V.
A second problem is that stimuli in the oral modality are always
transient. This limits the possibility of an “outside memory,” (O’Re-
gan 1992) and makes it more difficult to create an isomorphic rep-
resentation. Conscious reanalysis of the signal is impossible or
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